There are many policies around the world aimed at integrating groups (gender, ethnic, national) in education, employment, immigration and housing. In the case of housing, since prices may not internalize externalities in residential location choices, we need to know preferences for welfare analysis. This paper estimates people's taste for living with own ethnic groups (ethnic preferences) using unique policy variation from the ethnic housing quotas in Singapore. My approach combines policy induced variation commonly used in reduced form settings with a non-parametric identi…cation strategy in a structural demand estimation framework à la Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) . I …nd that all groups have strong preferences to live with at least some other members of their ethnic group but the shapes of preferences di¤er. The majority (the Chinese) exhibit preferences that are inverted U-shaped so that after a neighborhood is segregated enough, they have preferences for some diversity. Relative to 3 selected towns where pre-quota data on ethnic proportions was available, I …nd that the quotas have moved the minority proportions more than half way (within 5 percentage points) to the …rst best allocation of ethnic groups. This change is likely to be an upper bound in magnitude because these towns were probably selected because they were more segregated to begin with. I wish to thank my advisors Esther Du ‡o, Amy Finkelstein, Panle Jia and Bill Wheaton for guidance and support. I am also deeply indebted to
Introduction
There are many policies around the world aimed at integrating groups (gender, ethnic, national) in education, employment, immigration and housing.
1 Externalities provide an economic rationale for these public policies but externalities also complicate welfare analysis.
In housing, for example, an individual's decision on where to locate could a¤ect his neighbor's utility by changing the neighborhood ethnic composition. Since prices may not internalize these externalities, we need to know people's preferences for welfare analysis. This paper estimates people's taste for living with own ethnic groups (ethnic preferences) using unique policy variation from the ethnic housing quotas in Singapore. Did these quotas work relative to the …rst best allocation of ethnic groups? This paper uses estimated ethnic preferences to answer this question.
Estimating taste for own ethnic neighbors is hard because the omitted variables (neighborhood quality) are ethnic-speci…c. 2 Did a Chinese choose a neighborhood because it has many Chinese or many Chinese temples? In other words, the key explanatory variable, percent Chinese, is endogenous. To address the endogeneity of price in the demand function, a common approach in the demand estimation literature is to exploit within neighborhood variation using neighborhood …xed e¤ects. 3 This is not su¢ cient when both price and percent Chinese are endogenous because some neighborhoods could have disproportionately more Chinese temples, for example. My approach is to model neighborhood-by-ethnic group …xed e¤ects by exploiting within neighborhood, across ethnic group variation created by the 1 In the Netherlands, amounts explicitly earmarked for "integration"in the governments'budgets increased from e9 million in 1970 to e1.1 billion in 2003 (Commissie Blok, 2004) . In Chicago, the Gautreaux program (the predecessor of the Moving Towards Opportunity program) encouraged residential desegregation using housing vouchers (Jennan, 2000) . Many countries have a¢ rmative action policies on college admissions and employment.
2 Speci…cally, I use the term ethnic-speci…c omitted variables to refer to unobserved quality (as measured by amenities like Chinese temples, for example) that are di¤erentially preferred by an ethnic group relative to other groups. 3 For example, to estimate the taste for cereals, Nevo (2001) uses a model with brand …xed e¤ects. If taste for cereal quality was income group-speci…c, one would need a model with brand-by-income …xed e¤ects. 1 ethnic housing quotas.
The ethnic quotas help identi…cation by allowing housing prices to di¤er across ethnic groups via a price discrimination mechanism. They were introduced in 1989 to encourage residential integration amongst the three major ethnic groups in Singapore -Chinese (77%), Malays (14%) and Indians (8%) (Singapore Census, 2000) . The policy is a set of upper bounds on block level and neighborhood level ethnic proportions. Any transactions that forced these blocks and neighborhoods farther above the upper bound, however, would be barred. For example, when Chinese quotas are binding, non-Chinese sellers cannot sell to Chinese buyers because this transaction increases the Chinese proportion farther above the Chinese quota. These ethnic-speci…c restrictions on transactions play a central role in the price discrimination mechanism by restricting arbitrage. 4 In addition to generating across ethnic group variation via price discrimination, a second reason the ethnic quotas help identi…cation of ethnic preferences is that the policy rule is a step function. Units above the upper bound on ethnic proportions are constrained (the quota status is 1) while units below the upper bound are unconstrained (the quota status is 0). I embed a non-parametric identi…cation strategy within a structural framework by using the quota step function to instrument for ethnic-speci…c prices. The assumption is that all characteristics, except quotas, do not a¤ect prices discontinuously at the quota cuto¤. 5 4 Without the quotas, Chinese and non-Chinese buyers cannot be charged di¤erent prices for the same neighborhood because of arbitrage. Once Chinese quotas bind, non-Chinese sellers cannot arbitrage by selling to Chinese buyers even if Chinese buyers are paying a higher price than non-Chinese buyers. So, for the same neighborhood, the quotas can allow Chinese and non-Chinese prices to di¤er. 5 This identi…cation strategy bears more than a passing resemblance to Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan's (2007) use of boundary discontinuity design in a structural model. Instead of using instrumental variables, they restrict part of their analysis to houses close to school district boundaries. The underlying idea is that di¤erential sorting across school district boundaries generate arguably exogenous variation in ethnic proportions. The school district boundary dummy can be thought of as a good instrument for ethnic proportions because ethnic proportions change across boundaries but the main source of sorting -school quality -is observed and can be controlled for. It is tempting to follow them here by restricting analysis close to the quota discontinuity and use the quota dummy to instrument for ethnic proportions. However, the quota dummy is itself a function of ethnic proportions. Restricting analysis close to the quota cuto¤ will have signi…cant external validity issues in the estimation of ethnic preferences. Moreover, quotas are not I embed this non-parametric identi…cation strategy in a structural demand estimation framework à la Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) , hereafter BLP. They estimate the demand for cars with an omitted variable (quality) that is common across ethnic groups. To estimate the taste for living with own ethnic neighbors, neighborhood quality is ethnic-speci…c. Hence, I need to relax the traditional assumption in BLP that product attributes are common across ethnic groups. Consequently, in addition to instrumenting for prices (as BLP did), I also instrument for neighborhood ethnic proportions. In practice, I estimate 3 BLP models, one for each ethnic group, using method of simulated moments.
To implement this analysis, obtaining data on ethnic proportions at a disaggregated level was challenging. I collected individual data on residential location choices by matching names from the 2005 and 2006 Singapore residential phonebooks. I hand matched more than 589,000 names to ethnicities.
6 I also collected data on neighborhood characteristics, prices and quotas for 170 neighborhoods. I downloaded data on 25,192 transaction prices, but I do not have data on the ethnicity of the buyers and sellers.
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I …nd that all groups have strong preferences for living with other members of their ethnic group but the shapes of preferences di¤er across ethnic groups. The Chinese and the Indians have ethnic preferences that are inverted U-shaped but the Malays do not. After a neighborhood is segregated enough, Indians and Chinese would rather add a new neighbor from the other groups. These estimates are signi…cant at the 5% level. Malays appear to have strong and monotonic preferences for Malay neighbors, although the estimates for good instruments for ethnic proportions because they do not generate variation in ethnic proportions across the cuto¤s (as school district boundaries do) but quotas do generate variation in ethnic-speci…c prices via price discrimination. 6 In Singapore, one's ethnicity depends on the father's ethnicity. Also, inter-ethnic marriages are fairly rare (10%) mostly because the di¤erent ethnic groups have di¤erent religions. The Chinese are primarily Buddhists (54%) and Christians (17%), the Malays are 100% Muslims and the Indians are primarily Hindus (55%) and Muslims (12%). (Singapore Census, 2000) 7 Not observing ethnic-speci…c prices is a limitation that is speci…c to my dataset. For the rest of the paper, I discuss the identi…cation strategy assuming I observe group-speci…c prices. In the data section, I discuss how I estimate group-speci…c prices using a weighted average of prices and observed weights. their taste parameters are not signi…cant. Relative to 3 segregated towns before the quota, I …nd that after 10 years, the quotas have moved the Malay and Indian proportions more than half way (within 5 percentage points) towards the …rst best allocation of ethnic groups.
The magnitude of this change is likely an upper bound because data on these towns were published to motivate the need for the quota policy because they were very segregated to begin with. This paper has at least 2 implications that extend beyond Singapore. The …nding that some groups have preferences for diversity is arguably generalizable to other countries and contexts. Many examples in Schelling (1971) assume some preferences for diversity. In fact, he conjectured that ethnic quotas could be a useful policy tool for desegregation (Schellling, 1971 ). This paper is an empirical investigation of this conjecture. Secondly, there are many policies in the world that work like price discrimination, such as hiring quotas, a¢ rmative action and zoning policies. The idea is if some groups can live in North Carolina but not in Chicago, prices will adjust in response to the restriction in choice sets. One can exploit variation from this type of natural experiments in a structural framework to recover policy relevant parameters. This is one of a few papers that combine variation from natural experiments commonly used in reduced form settings within a structural framework (see Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) for an excellent example of another approach).
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In the next section, I discuss the background of ethnic quotas in Singapore. Then, I
describe the data (Section 3) and provide a descriptive analysis of quota e¤ects on housing prices (Section 4). I then build a model of individual utility over residential locations with ethnic-speci…c prices (Section 5), discuss estimation of the structural model (Section 6) and present the results (Section 7). Finally, I conclude in Section 8.
Background
Singapore is a multi-ethnic country with a population of 4.5 million (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2006). The three major ethnic groups are the Chinese (77%), the Malays (14%) and the Indians (8%). The Chinese have the highest median monthly income (S$2335), followed by the Indians (S$2167) and the Malays (S$1790) (Singapore Census, 2000) .
Public housing is the most popular choice of housing in Singapore with 82% of the resident population living in public housing (HDB, 2006) . The units are built and managed by the Housing Development Board (HDB). There are three ways Singapore residents can live in a HDB ‡at. They may apply through the primary allocation system for new HDB ‡ats, they may purchase existing HDB ‡ats in the resale market or they may rent. The rental market is negligible: 98% percent of the HDB ‡ats are owner-occupied (HDB, 2006) . This paper focuses on the resale market which is the relevant market for the ethnic quotas. Relative to the primary market which is heavily regulated, the resale market functions as an open market.
To understand the ethnic quotas, it is important to understand the geography of housing markets in Singapore. The smallest spatial unit is an HDB ‡at. A group of HDB ‡ats constitute an HDB block. A group of HDB blocks make up a neighborhood. An HDB block is comparable to a US Census block group, with an average of 70 households. An HDB neighborhood is comparable to a US Census tract, comprising an average of 60 HDB blocks.
Throughout my analysis, I de…ne a market as a cluster of neighborhoods.
The government of Singapore introduced the Ethnic Integration Policy to address the "problem" of the increase in the "concentrations of racial groups" in HDB estates (Parliamentary debate, 1989) . The policy was announced in a parliamentary debate on February 16, 1989 and implemented starting March 1, 1989. The Policy is a set of quotas at the block and neighborhood level. Table 1 lists the quotas, in comparison to the 2000 national ethnic   5 proportions. Neighborhood quotas are 2% to 8% above national ethnic proportions. Block quotas are 3% above neighborhood quotas, allowing more ‡exibility at the block level (blocks can be more segregated than neighborhoods). In practice, the HDB did not want to evict owners in existing units that were in violation of the quotas. To this day, there exist blocks and neighborhoods above the quota.
The quotas are upper bounds on ethnic proportions to prevent HDB communities that are already segregated from becoming more segregated. Once a community hits the upper bound, transactions that make the community more segregated will be blocked. However, other transactions will be allowed. In particular, transactions involving buyers and sellers from the same ethnicity will always be allowed because this does not increase the ethnic proportion. As an example, Table 1 shows that the Chinese neighborhood quota is set at 84%. Once Chinese make up more than 84% of the neighborhood population, Chinese buyers can no longer buy from non-Chinese sellers because this increases the proportion of Chinese in that neighborhood. 10 In principle, one could use just 1 phonebook to analyze the residential location choices of all residents in Singapore (using the choice data of both movers and stayers). I focus on using the choices of movers instead of all residents because choices of movers are actual location choices involving costly transactions.
11 Multiple names will not a¤ect my analysis because only the ethnicity of the buyer matters in the calculation of the ethnic shares. For my purposes, ethnicity depends only on names.
12 The actual number of transactions (25,182) is higher than the number of movers (16, 092) . This could be due to spelling errors between names in the 2005 phonebook and the 2006 phonebook. I assume that the spelling errors are random such that the choice data of movers is not a selected sample.
There are 13 neighborhoods with no movers in my sample period at all, 2 neighborhoods with no Chinese movers, 4 with no Malay movers, 6 with no Indian movers and 1 with no Malay nor Indian movers. For these neighborhoods, I assign their shares to be the minimum share for each ethnic group. 13 Note that ethnic proportions describe the ethnic distribution of the stock of residents while ethnic shares refer to the ‡ow of movers. In my analysis, I
use ethnic shares as a proxy for demand and ethnic proportions as the primary explanatory variable. The assumption is that the ‡ow of movers is so small that the ethnic proportion of the stock of residents is essentially constant within a year. I observe these weights from the phonebook data. Essentially, I estimate ethnic-speci…c prices using transaction prices from the data and ethnic weights from the phone book. I discuss how I estimate ethnic-speci…c prices in Appendix 2. In the next section, I present descriptive evidence …rst using observed prices (without ethnic information), followed by results using estimated ethnic-speci…c prices.
Early ethnic settlements
I use data on early 19th century ethnic settlements in Singapore to instrument for ethnic proportions. Figure 1a shows the map of early 19th century Singapore according to the Jackson Plan (Crawfurd, 1828) . Four separate residential areas were designated for the Chinese, Malays, Indians and Europeans. The Malay and European towns were to the east of the Singapore River while the Chinese and Indian areas were to the west of the 13 Because the estimation involves the inversion of ethnic shares, shares of neighborhoods that are zero are not invertible. As an approximation, I assign minimum shares to these neighborhoods. 8 river. Figure 1b shows the distribution of quota-constrained neighborhoods now. Malayconstrained neighborhoods are primarily in the east while the Chinese neighborhoods are in Central, South and West Singapore and the Indian neighborhoods are in Central and North
Singapore. This suggests that the Malay neighborhoods expanded to the east of the river. I de…ne a dummy variable that is 1 when the entire area of the neighborhood is in the east of the eastern end of early Malay settlements, and 0 otherwise. Table 3 lists the summary statistics of the full dataset. There are 170 neighborhoods.
The ethnic shares are very low (the means for all groups are below 0.5%) indicating that the ‡ow of buyers is very low. The Chinese quotas bind for almost one-…fth of the sample, the Malay quotas bind for one-tenth of the sample and the Indian quotas bind for a quarter of the sample.
Price E¤ects at the Quota
Recall my approach to addressing the endogeneity of ethnic-speci…c quality such as Chinese temples is to rely on across ethnic group price variation in a model with neighborhoodby-group …xed e¤ects. The key assumption here is that prices vary across ethnic groups because ethnic quotas prevent sellers from arbitraging price di¤erences across ethnic groups (when the Chinese quotas bind, non-Chinese sellers cannot sell to Chinese buyers even if the Chinese buyers are paying a higher price).
This section is a descriptive analysis of this price discrimination assumption in the spirit of regression discontinuity (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hahn, Todd and Van der Klauuw, 2000) .
I focus on 2 questions: Is there a discontinuity in observed prices at the quota? Do estimated prices di¤er across ethnic groups when the quotas bind?
14 In this section, I present descriptive evidence that suggest prices vary across ethnic groups in my data. In a separate paper, Wong (2008) , I use a simple theoretical framework and regression discontinuity analysis to understand the implication of …nding a discontinuity in housing characteristics.
Is there a discontinuity in observed prices?
Throughout this section, I estimate the following equations:
where ln P bjit is the log of the price of units in block b, neighborhood j, town i and month t; QC bjit is a dummy for whether the Chinese (C) quotas are binding, pctC In Table 4 , columns 1-5 correspond to the regression close to the Chinese quota, columns 6-10 correspond to the Malay quota regression and columns 11-15 correspond to the Indian quota regression. For each ethnic quota, I estimate the regression controlling for polynomials of the ethnic proportion, up to the 4th order (…rst 4 columns) and controlling for observed building characteristics (such as age, number of 1-room ‡ats, number of 2-room ‡ats etc.) and month and town …xed e¤ects (5th column).
If sellers could arbitrage perfectly, we should expect prices to be smooth across the quota cuto¤. I …nd robust evidence of discontinuities in prices at the Chinese and Malay quotas but not the Indian quotas. In the baseline speci…cation (with no …xed e¤ects), discontinuities in prices for all quotas range from magnitudes of 3% to 11%. 15 All estimates are signi…cant at the 1% level. Once I add other controls, the estimates for the Indian quotas are not signi…cant. This could be because Indians are such a small minority that almost 95% of the neighborhoods fall within 10% of the Indian quota. Figure 2 summarizes these …ndings.
Do estimated prices di¤er across ethnic groups?
Using estimated ethnic-speci…c prices, I test for di¤erences in prices across ethnic groups when the quotas bind. The quotas have a clear prediction on the impact on prices by ethnicity. For example, when the Chinese quota binds, non-Chinese sellers cannot sell to Chinese buyers. Above the quota, this will increase the price that Chinese buyers pay and decrease the price that non-Chinese sellers can accept. To test this, I estimate:
where now, QC bjit is a dummy that is 1 when only the Chinese quota in block b in neighborhood j, town i and month t is binding; QC bjit QI bjit is a dummy when both the Chinese The key coe¢ cients of interest here are the 0 s and the 0 s. The idea is to test if Chinese buyers paid a higher price for Chinese-constrained blocks ( 0 s > 0) and non-Chinese buyers paid a lower price for Chinese-constrained blocks ( 0 s 0). This suggests that ethnic prices di¤ered for the same neighborhood. Table 5 shows the results from the estimation. The 3 columns correspond to the regression for the Chinese, Malay and Indian quotas.
I …nd suggestive evidence that prices di¤er across ethnic groups for Chinese and Malay quotas but not the Indian quotas. The standard errors are albeit quite large. Column 1 shows that Chinese buyers paid 6% more in Chinese-constrained blocks ( 1 ) but non-Chinese buyers ( 0s) did not seem to pay a higher price The Malay quota has a similar e¤ect except the standard errors are larger and I …nd that, contrary to expectations, blocks where both the Malay and Indian quotas bind, Malay and Indian buyers paid a signi…cantly lower price.
The results for the estimation close to the Indian quota (column 3) do not follow the same pattern. These …ndings could again be attributed to the earlier …nding that the discontinuity generated by the Indian quotas disappears after controlling for unit characteristics and …xed e¤ects.
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At this point, one could take the descriptive analysis one step further and use the hedonic method and regression discontinuity to estimate ethnic preferences (Rosen, 1974; Chay and Greenstone, 2004) . The idea is to address omitted variable bias in demand estimation by examining estimates of the hedonic price function right above and below the discontinuity.
In ongoing work, I explore the possibilities of estimating ethnic preferences using the hedonic model versus the discrete choice model (see Bayer et al., 2007 for a comparison of estimates from hedonic methods and structural methods).
Utility Speci…cation
To recover ethnic preferences of households away from the discontinuity, I make some assumptions on the functional form of the utility and distributional assumptions on the heterogeneity of individuals. The goal of the structural estimation is to recover individual preferences from aggregate data using the method of simulated moments. I begin with a random coe¢ cients model of individual utility for residential neighborhoods that is then aggregated to obtain market-level demands to be matched with aggregate sample moments.
Suppose we observe m=1, ..., M markets, each with i G =1, ..., I 
for j=1, ..., J m 8m, where X G jm is a K-dimensional (row) vector of observed neighborhood characteristics (including ethnic proportions), P G jm is the price that a buyer of group G has to pay for a unit in neighborhood j in market m, G jm is the ethnic-speci…c preference for the unobserved neighborhood amenity (neighborhood quality) and " G ijm represents mean-zero, idiosyncratic individual preferences for a buyer of group G, assumed to be independent of neighborhood characteristics, prices and of each other. Note that prices are now indexed by G. This is a consequence of the price discrimination mechanism of the quotas that I exploit to recover taste for ethnic-speci…c quality G jm . To keep notation simple, I will drop the market subscript from here on.
We can write the buyers' taste parameters as a mean component and an individual-13 speci…c deviation from the mean relative to a neighborhood with 1% more outgroup neighbors, evaluated for the households living in the average Chinese neighborhood. Allowing neighborhood quality ( ) to vary by group allows the interpretation of these parameters as taste for ethnic ingroup interactions, that is separate from the taste for ethnic-speci…c neighborhood quality. Other observed neighborhood attributes included in X G jm are school quality, access to public transportation, average number of rooms and average age of HDB blocks in neighborhood j.
The speci…cation is completed with the introduction of an "outside good" (j=0) -buyers may choose not to move.
19 Note that I assume mean preferences vary by group but the standard deviation does not ( P is not indexed by G). This is mostly a limitation of my data. Identi…cation of relies on variation in choice sets across markets (Petrin, 2002 and BLP, 2004) . I only have 7 markets in my data.
Since market shares depend only on di¤erences in utilities, the actual estimation algorithm subtracts U G i0 from U G ij such that utility is de…ned relative to the outside good.
Substituting (5) into (4) and grouping individual-speci…c terms together, we can write the utility speci…cation parsimoniously as U
which is simply the mean utility for neighborhood j
and an individual-speci…c deviation from that mean
There are two features in (7) that will be relevant for estimation. First, utility from neighborhood quality only depends on the quality of that neighborhood alone. 20 This implies that using attributes of nearby neighborhoods as instruments will satisfy the exclusion restriction because these attributes are not correlated with G j by de…nition. Second, the omitted variable ( ) enters the mean utility ( ) linearly. This allows the estimation of (7) using linear instrumental variable techniques (Berry and Pakes, 2007) .
The …rst two terms in (8) are the interaction between consumer tastes ( ) and neighborhood characteristics (x) that determine substitution patterns in discrete choice models (McFadden et al., 1977; Hausman and Wise, 1978; BLP, 1995) . The parameter, , is commonly thought of as a measure of heterogeneity. As increases, neighborhoods that are similar in characteristics space become better substitutes because individuals with high ik will tend to substitute towards products with high x jk .
A limitation of the speci…cation is that equation (4) has no income. This is unrealistic given that housing is often a big transaction in people's lifetime. An immediate implication is the inability to distinguish between income and ethnic segregation preferences in the model.
To return to the model of individual utility, market-level aggregate consumer behavior is obtained by aggregating the choices implied by the individual utility model over the distribution of consumer attributes. Let F G be the population distribution function of individual-level attributes for group G. The fraction of households of group G that choose neighborhood j (aggregate demand) is obtained by integrating over the set of individual attributes that imply a preference for neighborhood j. Let the group G share for neighborhood j be
where
and
Following the literature, I assume that the idiosyncratic errors, the " 
Note that the omitted variable ( ), enters the mean utility term ( ), linearly but it enters demand non-linearly. This complicates the use of standard non-linear instrumental variables method to address omitted variable bias. To address the problem of non-linear omitted variables ( ), Berry (1994) shows that we can invert the market share function to recover the choice speci…c constant ( ). Since this choice speci…c constant is a linear function of quality, once we have recovered , we can use standard instrumental variables methods to estimate the mean utility equation (7) by …nding instruments for endogenous neighborhood attributes that are orthogonal to quality ( ) :
Estimation
Using the model of individual utility above, I recover the taste parameters,
o by matching aggregate moments predicted from the model to sample moments using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM).
Method of Simulated Moments
The following moment condition is assumed to hold at the true parameter value, 0 2 R p :
where g( ) 2 R l with l p is a vector of moment functions that speci…es that the (structural) error, , is uncorrelated with the instruments, denoted by an JxL matrix, Z. To form the moments, we …rst need to recover G .
For each ethnic group G, I …rst guess values for G which I use to calculate the share function using equations (9) and (11) : I use the contraction mapping provided in Berry (1994) to …nd the value of G that makes the observed ethnic shares, s G , equal to the predicted shares de…ned in equation (9). Notice that the integral in the share function, no longer has a closed form solution. I simulate the integral by drawing R=10,000 G0 i s independently for each group G and calculating the Logit form in equation (11) ;which is then aggregated out to obtain the market level shares.. After recovering the mean utility, G ; by inverting the ethnic share function, I calculate G using equation (7) and the estimated prices. Now that we have an estimate of the (structural) error, G ,we are ready to form the moments.
I stack the moments for the estimation of each ethnic group and de…ne = f C ; M ; I g.
The simulated moments are
An MSM estimator, b ; minimizes a weighted quadratic form in
where J is an LxL positive, semi-de…nite weighting matrix. Assume ]. Under some mild regularity conditions, Pakes and Pollard (1989) and McFadden (1989) show that:
where R is the number of simulations,
is used as the weighting matrix, the MSM estimator,^ , is asymptotically e¢ cient, with its asymptotic variance being
To account for the error from using estimated prices instead of observed prices, I follow the discussion in Newey (1984) on sequential estimators and method of moments. We can think of the exercise above in the context of GMM where there are 2 moments and parameters are estimated sequentially. First, we estimate prices with parameters and (the …rst moments are g 1 ( ; )). Then, using these parameters as inputs, the second moments are just the standard BLP moments, g 2 ( ;^ ;^ ). To calculate the standard errors, I stack the BLP moments and the moments from the estimation of prices and calculate standard errors using equation (15).
Identi…cation
This paper extends the BLP approach to address 2 related challenges to identi…cation of ethnic preferences. First, to address endogeneity of ethnic-speci…c quality ( Table 6 summarizes the assumptions and thought experiments in the identi…cation strategy.
Ethnic proportions
I instrument for ethnic proportions using attributes of nearby neighborhoods as well as historical settlement data. I use the sum of rival product attributes (in my case, I use attributes of neighborhoods in 1-3km rings, 3-5km rings and 5-7km rings). The attributes include average number of rooms, average age of building, school quality and average distance to the closest subway station. I chose 1km as the cuto¤ because the neighborhoods would be far enough to avoid spatial correlation with own neighborhood. I chose 2km widths so that all neighborhoods would have at least one nearby neighborhood within the ring.
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The idea of using attributes of nearby neighborhoods is that Chinese, Malays and Indians 21 One can repeat this analysis in other markets without the price discrimination mechanism but this would be analogous to estimating a model with state-by-year …xed e¤ects when the policy only generates variation at the state level. 22 One neighborhood, Changi Village, is located at the Eastern tip of Singapore. There are no neighborhoods within 1-3km of Changi Village. I assign values of the instruments to be zero for Changi Village. In addition to using attributes of nearby neighborhoods to instrument for ethnic proportions, I also use a dummy variable on whether units are to the east of the early Malay settlement. The idea is that assignment of Malay settlements to the east of the Singapore River imply that subsequent Malay neighborhoods were more likely to develop on the east side of the Singapore River but this assignment is assumed to be independent of neighborhood quality.
Ethnic-speci…c prices
I instrument for ethnic-speci…c prices using characteristics of nearby neighborhoods and estimated quota status. Speci…cally, I follow BLP (1995) and use the sum of the exogenous characteristics of rival neighborhoods.
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While attributes of nearby neighborhoods could instrument for common prices, it is hard to think of them as good instruments for ethnic-speci…c prices. One would expect quota status to be highly correlated with ethnic-speci…c prices (Chinese prices are high when the Chinese quota binds). However, actual quota status is not a valid instrument because it is positively correlated with quality (Chinese quotas are more likely to bind when Chinese neighborhood quality is high).
To estimate quotas, I exploit the step function in the policy rule. First, I estimate the block (neighborhood) level ethnic proportions using the instruments above. Then, I assign the estimated block (neighborhood) quotas to be 1 if the estimated block (neighborhood) ethnic proportions are above the block (neighborhood) level quotas and 0 otherwise. The estimation equation for block and neighborhood proportions are
where G=(C)hinese, (M)alays and (I)ndians, b indexes blocks and j indexes neighborhoods.
The variable, pctG is the percent of residents from group G, X ex is the set of exogenous observed characteristics, East is a dummy for whether the neighborhood is to the east of the early Malay settlements, Z is the set of exogenous characteristics of nearby neighborhoods.
Constructing instruments using this step function is akin to non-parametric identi…cation.
Quotas a¤ect prices according to the step function (above the upper bound, prices di¤er across ethnic groups). The instruments, X ex , Z and East, could a¤ect prices but the e¤ect is assumed to be not discontinuous at the upper bound. Therefore, even though the quotas were estimated by projecting neighborhood proportions onto the space of X ex , Z and East, the estimated quotas should still have power to predict ethnic prices. To check this, I estimate the following equations 7 Estimates of ethnic preferences Table 7 reports results from regressions of actual quota status on estimated quota status. The …rst 3 columns do not control for other instruments that I used to predict ethnic proportions.
The coe¢ cients on the estimated quotas are all positive and signi…cant. After controlling for instruments (columns 4-6), the key coe¢ cient for Chinese and Malay quotas remain signi…cant but not for Indian quotas. This could be because the discontinuity from the Indian quotas essentially disappears after controlling for …xed e¤ects and unit characteristics as shown in the descriptive analysis (the last column in Table 4 ). Table 8 reports results from estimating a Logit model with OLS (columns 1-3) and IV (columns 4-6) where the dependent variables are the log of the ethnic shares, ln(s The estimated marginal utilities for Malays are positive for both terms, albeit not signi…cant.
Using the estimates on marginal utilities from 25 Since distance to subway and age of building are bad characteristics, I used the negative of their marginal utilities in the MRS calculation so that a positive MRS re ‡ects ingroup preferences and a negative MRS re ‡ects outgroup preferences for the marginal neighbor. For example, the MRS with respect to distance to the subway is calculated as ( Table 10 shows the MRS's evaluated at neighborhoods with the mean, the 10th percentile, and the 90th percentile of ethnic proportions. The MRS for the Indians (the 2nd and 3rd panels in the last column) suggests that Indians have ingroup preferences that are inverted U-shaped. The average Indian household living in a neighborhood with 5% Indians (the 10th percentile) is willing to substitute to a neighborhood that is 2.56km further from the closest subway station in exchange for a neighborhood with a 1 standard deviation (3%) increase in the proportion of Indians. This distance is relatively far considering the average household reported that the maximum acceptable walking distance to a subway station is 0.53km (HDB, 2000) . 26 On the contrary, the average Indian household living in a neighborhood with 8% Indians (the mean) is willing to substitute to a neighborhood that is 0.21km closer to the subway station for the same 1 standard deviation increase in the percent of ingroup neighbors.
The …nding that Chinese exhibit positive outgroup preferences at the margin is sugges-26 This is based on a survey conducted by the HDB to study the pro…le of public housing residents in Singapore. The distance is calculated by the surveyors in HDB based on a rate of conversion of 10 minutes to 500m of walking distance. There are 2 types of subway stations; the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) is the primary subway while the Light Rapid Transit (LRT) is relatively new and limited. The number given above refers to the distance to an MRT station. tive evidence against ethnic discrimination. The concern with ethnic discrimination is that Malay enclaves may form even when Malays have no ingroup preferences, simply because the Chinese are discriminating against Malays and forcing them into Malay enclaves. This could mean that my estimate of Malay ingroup preferences is an overestimate. However, to the extent that the Chinese are discriminating against outgroups, the Chinese should have strong negative outgroup preferences, which is not what I …nd.
Finding the First Best
Did the ethnic housing quotas in Singapore move the equilibrium closer towards the …rst best allocation of ethnic groups? In this section, I use the preference estimates above to …nd the …rst best allocation and compare it to the existing decentralized equilibrium under the quota regime.
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The social planner's problem is to …nd the allocation of ethnicities into neighborhoods that will maximize a social welfare function, assumed to be utilitarian here. The social planner is assigning individuals into neighborhoods. Let j (i) represent the assignment function where j (i) = j 0 means that individual i is assigned to neighborhood j'. Using this notation, individual i's utility is de…ned as U i U ij(i) and
The social planner's problem is to choose the assignment of individuals that maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function.
27 With estimates of preferences, one can think about calculating compensating and equivalent variation measures of the policy. However, this exercise appears to be much harder because models with social interactions inherently have multiple equilibria. See Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2007) for an example of how to estimate structural models with multiple equilibria. 28 The de…nition U i U ij(i) departs from the decentralized equilibrium where the individual chooses the neighborhood that maximizes his utility,
In a decentralized equilibrium, individuals choose the neighborhood that maximizes his own utility, without internalizing the e¤ect of his choice on percent Ingroup. The social planner, by contrast, may assign an individual to a neighborhood that is suboptimal for him, but optimal for his neighbors. 29 See Appendix 3 for the simulation details.
Do quotas get us closer to the …rst best?
What does the …rst best allocation look like? Figure 4 plots the density of percent Chinese, percent M alay and percent Indian now (dashed line) and under …rst best (solid line).
The Chinese and Indian proportions are less segregated under …rst best whilst the Malay proportions are more segregated. Currently, there are no neighborhoods with less than 60%
Chinese but in the …rst best allocation, there are 25 such neighborhoods. Similarly, there are currently 91 neighborhoods with fewer than 8% Indians but in the …rst best, there are 113 such neighborhoods. For the Malays, there are 21 more neighborhoods with more than 33% Malays in the …rst best case.
Did the ethnic housing quotas get the market closer towards …rst best? Table 11 looks at 3 towns where there is data on ethnic proportions before the quota was implemented in 1989. 30 Redhill was known as a Chinese town, Bedok was a Malay town and Yishun was an Indian town. Twenty years ago, in 1988, the Malay and Indian proportions in Bedok and Yishun were almost 4 times the …rst best levels. Ten years after the introduction of the quotas, in 1998, the Malay and Indian towns, Bedok and Yishun, were already within 5% of the …rst best Malay and Indian proportions. The magnitude of this change is likely an upper 29 Although the optimal mix for the average Chinese and Indian household are estimated at 43% and 8% respectively, not all neighborhoods will converge towards these percentages for 2 reasons. First, it is impossible to have all neighborhoods with only 43% Chinese because Chinese make up 77% of the population. Secondly, there is heterogeneity in other characteristics, in particular, the ethnic-speci…c quality G j . 30 It is important to point out that towns are bigger than neighborhoods and this comparison is based on a selected sample, primarily because data on ethnic proportions at a disaggregated level are not available, especially in 1988.
bound because data on these towns were published to motivate the need for the quota policy because they were very segregated to begin with. Based on this selected sample, the quotas seem to be successful at moving the Malay and Indian proportions closer towards …rst best but not the Chinese proportions, probably because the Chinese have preferences for diversity but they are such a majority that it is hard to lower Chinese neighborhood proportions.
There are two major caveats to the discussion above. First, the taste estimation assumes that all ethnic groups share a common taste for characteristics such as school quality. Second, this welfare exercise assumes that other characteristics, such as school quality, do not change in response to the change in ethnic proportions. If Chinese proportions are positively correlated with school quality, creating more diverse neighborhoods by lowering Chinese proportions could lower the school quality in those neighborhoods. If Chinese care more about education than the minorities, this e¤ect could o¤-set the Chinese taste for diversity since lowering Chinese proportions could also lower school quality.
Conclusion and Future Research
Motivated by the ethnic housing quotas in Singapore, this paper builds and estimates a discrete choice model of residential location choices by combining policy variation commonly used in a reduced form setting with a non-parametric identi…cation strategy within a structural demand estimation framework. I exploit the step function in the quota rule as well as within neighborhood, across ethnic group variation in prices to identify ethnic preferences from tastes for unobserved ethnic-speci…c neighborhood quality.
I …nd that all groups have strong preferences to live with at least some other members of their ethnic group. However, the Chinese and the Indians exhibit preferences that are inverted U-shaped so that after a neighborhood is segregated enough, they would rather add a new neighbor from the other group. Comparing data from 3 segregated towns before the 27 quota to the …rst best allocation, I …nd that after 10 years, the quotas have moved the Malay and Indian proportions more than half way (within 5 percentage points) to the …rst best although this could be an upper bound as discussed above.
In ongoing work, I explore the possibilities of combining hedonic methods and regression discontinuity to estimate ethnic preferences as well as to compare estimates from the hedonic method and the discrete choice method. Future work will also include the use of estimates on ethnic preferences in this paper to simulate counterfactuals. The challenge in performing such welfare calculations is that sorting models with social interactions typically have multiple equilibria. Findings from this type of simulation can inform the relative deadweight losses and the distributional implications of various integration policies that will need to be weighed against social bene…ts of integration. Note: School quality is measured as the total number of awards given to primary, secondary schools and tertiary institutions by the Singapore Ministry of Education. 
28
N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y Month N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y Town N N N N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y
Dependent variables
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: The first 5 columns are restricted to be 10% above and below the Chinese quota, the next 5 columns, correspond to the Malay quota, and the last 5 columns correspond to the Indian quota. Columns 1-4, 6-9, 11-14 include results from regressions with a quota dummy and polynomials (up to 4 th order) of the block level ethnic proportions. Columns 5, 10 and 15 control for unit characteristics (average age of building, its squared, number of 1-room flats, 2-room flats etc.), month and town fixed effects. 
Note: Each column is a regression restricted to 10% above and below the Chinese, Malay and Indian quotas. Controls include average age of building, its squared, number of 1-room flats, 2-room flats etc. The omitted group is the Chinese buyer (column 1), the Malay buyer (column 2) and the Indian buyer (column 3). 
• Model neighborhood-by-group fixed effects ( G j δ instead of j δ ) using the price discrimination mechanism (the quotas generate variation across ethnic groups by preventing arbitrage)
• Consider 2 observationally identical neighborhoods, A and B.
• Prices depend on observed and unobserved neighborhood attributes.
• If Chinese paid a higher price than non-Chinese in neighborhood A compared to neighborhood B, since price is high when quality is high, this variation in ethnic prices has information on ethnic-specific neighborhood quality relative to other groups.
2. Prices and ethnic proportions are correlated to quality 2a. Instruments for ethnic proportions.
• Characteristics of nearby neighborhoods (1-3km, 3-5km and 5-7km rings).
• Historical ethnic settlements.
• Consider 2 observationally identical neighborhoods, A and (little) a. A is surrounded by neighborhoods with big units; (little) a is surrounded by neighborhoods with small units.
• Malays prefer bigger units because they have bigger families. So, they will sort differentially into neighborhood (little)a.
• This assumes that Malay settlements were exogenously assigned to the east of the Singapore River in the early 19 th century.
2b. Instruments for ethnic-prices,
• Characteristics of nearby neighborhoods (1-3km, 3-5km, 5-7km rings).
• Predicted quota dummy (using the step function).
• Characteristics of nearby neighborhoods affect prices through competition (see BLP, 1995) . In ongoing work, I follow Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) to construct a more powerful instrument by using the model to solve for a vector of prices that summarizes the information from all instruments.
• Quotas are correlated with ethnic prices through price discrimination. Construct a quota dummy, Q , in the following manner: Use the instruments in 2a to predict ethnic proportions. Let Q equal 1 if the predicted ethnic proportion is above the policy cutoff.
• Assumes that all neighborhood attributes, except quotas, do not change prices discontinuously at the policy cutoffs. 
Note: Results in columns 1-3 do not include other controls that will be in the full model, columns 4-6 control for own attributes and the instruments. The instruments are the sum of school awards, the distance to the closest subway station, the average age of buildings, the average number of rooms for nearby neighborhoods within 1-3km, 3-5km and within 5-7km, as well as a dummy for being in the east of the early Malay settlements. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the Chinese share for neighborhood j subtracted by the log of the Chinese share for the outside good (columns 1and 4). I define the dependent variables for the other columns in a similar manner. The instruments are the sum of school awards, the distance to the closest subway station, the average age of buildings, the average number of rooms for nearby neighborhoods within 1-3km, 3-5km and within 5-7km, a dummy for being in the east of the early Malay settlements as well as the estimated quotas. 2 is multiplied by 100. The instruments are the sum of school awards, the distance to the closest subway station, the average age of buildings, the average number of rooms for nearby neighborhoods within 1-3km, 3-5km and within 5-7km, a dummy for being in the east of the early Malay settlements as well as the estimated quotas. The second panel represents the MRS relative to the distance to the subway station and the third panel represents the MRS relative to the average age of the building. Since ingroup preferences are quadratic in percent ingroup, the marginal utilities vary with the percent of ingroups in the neighborhood. Each number in the 2 nd and 3 rd panel represents the marginal rate of substitution evaluated at neighborhoods with the mean, the 10 th percentile, and the 90 th percentile of Percent Ingroup. The MRS is calculated as the estimated marginal utility to live in a neighborhood with a one standard deviation increase in percent ingroup divided by the (negative of the) marginal utility for distance to the closest subway station (2 nd panel) as well as the (negative of the) marginal utility for the average building age (3 rd panel). Since distance to the subway and building age are both bad attributes, I use the negative of their marginal utilities in the denominators so that a positive MRS reflects ingroup preferences and a negative MRS reflects outgroup preferences. Although the MRS's for the Chinese are negative for all values of percent Chinese calculated for this table, Chinese do have positive MRS's when the percent of Chinese in a neighborhood is less than 43% (see Figure 3) . However, all neighborhoods in the sample have more than 43% Chinese, which is why the MRS shown here for the Chinese are all negative. Notes: Each panel in this figure is constructed using the following procedure for observations within 10% of the ethnic quotas: (i) regress the log of average transaction prices on the corresponding running variable (to a 4th order polynomial) and a dummy that is one when the corresponding block quota is binding; (ii) plot the predicted prices above and below the quota separately (iii) plot means of ln(price) for each 1% bin. I repeat the exercise for the Malay quotas and Indian quotas. Note: Each point on the line represents the ratio of the estimated marginal utility to live in a neighborhood with a one standard deviation increase in Percent Ingroup divided by the marginal utility for distance to the closest subway station. Since ingroup preferences are quadratic in Percent Ingroup, the marginal utility varies with the percent of ingroup in the neighborhood (x-axis).
The plot shows that in neighborhoods with less than 43% Chinese and 8% Indians respectively, the Chinese and Indians have a preference for a marginal neighbor who is Chinese. Above 43%, Chinese have a preference for a marginal neighbor who is from the outgroup. The minimums and maximums of the ethnic proportions in the sample are 61% and 98% for the Chinese; 0.6% and 33% for the Malays; 1.3% and 26% for the Indians. 
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